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THE ROLE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN
CANADA-U.S. RELATIONS
Matthew Schaefert
We were discussing earlier this morning the difference between Canadi-
ans and Americans. I think one difference that was not mentioned is that
Canadians have longer memories than the Americans do. I gave a talk on
NGOs at the Canadian Council on International Law in 19971 and I have not
written anything in the area since then. But Henry, some Canadian with a
long memory must have pointed this previous talk out to you, perhaps John
Fried. In any event, you have forced me to update my remarks. (laughter)
MR. KING: Right, right.
MR. SCHAEFER: My talk will actually tie in with the talks this morn-
ing. Premier Rae had mentioned this morning that disputes between Canada
and the United States are not just discussed between the federal governments
of the two countries. Disputes are a matter of public diplomacy and every
interest group is competing for public opinion on both sides of the border.
Therefore, this afternoon we can explore the various groups that are in that
competition for pubic opinion and the various groups that are involved in
Canada-U.S. disputes.
I thought we would start with the definition of what an NGO is. We are
not going to come to any conclusion on this matter here today. It is much
debated. However, one big distinction is whether you include in businesses,
for profit entities, or only non-profit entities. The standard definition or at
least the most commonly used definition only refers to non-profit entities,
such as environmental groups, human right groups, etc. A somewhat broader
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definition would include associations of businesses, not the for-profit entities
themselves, but at least the associations they enter into. While it is important
to be aware of these distinctions, I am going to focus on the most common or
narrower definition of NGO, excluding the for-profit entities for the moment.
We will bring these entities back into the discussion later.
I also might add that some definitions of an NGO would include this In-
stitute as well. This Institute has had a significant impact on U.S.-Canada
relations and I think Henry in particular is to be applauded and thanked for
that contribution.
THE HISTORY OF NGO PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL
FORUMS
When I was assigned this topic, the two places I looked to first were prior
proceedings of the Canada-U.S. Law Institute, an excellent place to start, and
the writings of Steve Charnovitz. If anybody knows Steve Charnovitz, he
does these amazing historical analyses of NGO participation in international
affairs.2
Therefore, when people are making claims that NGO involvement is
something new, he is able to rebut it by showing the long history of involve-
ment. He wrote a terrific article, I do not the have the citation for it here in
my remarks, but it certainly will be in the proceedings, showing that NGO
involvement in international governance is nothing new. In fact, the title of
this article is "Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Gov-
ernance." 3
Today, our focus, as always, is on U.S.-Canada relations specifically.
NGO involvement in U.S.-Canada relations dates back at least a century.
Indeed, others may raise examples in the question and answer period that
date even further back.4
There has been an increase in NGO involvement both generally in the in-
ternational system, as well in U.S.-Canada relations, in the last decade.5
Charnovitz refers to it as the "age of empowerment" of NGOs.6 Indeed, it is
the power and institutionalized involvement that NGOs have garnered in the
NAFTA and in U.S.-Canada relations, that is frequently cited to as support-
ing that claim more generally in the international system.
2 Le. Steve Charnovitz, The Emergence of Democratic Participation in Global Govern-
ance, 10 IND. J GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 45 (2003).
3 Steve Chamovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Govern-
ance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 183 (1997).
4 Id. at 185.
' Id. at 265.
6 Id. at 265
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Issues that NGOs have been involved in globally have included peace
worker solidarity, human rights, free trade, the environment, intellectual
property, transportation, narcotics, agricultural and liquor; and many of these
same issues have been the subject of NGO involvement in U.S.-Canada rela-
tions as well. The items on that list I just read that are excluded as topics for
NGO involvement in U.S.-Canada relations are generally a good sign, for
instance, peace. Henry mentioned earlier today that the United States and
Canada have the longest standing peaceful unprotected border. Both interna-
tionally and within U.S.-Canada relations specifically, environment is per-
haps the field in which NGOs have been the most active.
Just to reemphasize the point Charnovitz makes in his article that globally
NGO involvement is nothing new and to make the point that in U.S.-Canada
relations that NGO involvement is nothing new, let me describe a few his-
torical examples.
One of the earliest examples of NGO involvement in U.S.-Canada rela-
tions include the North American Fish and Game Protective Association,
which was established in 1902. The association lobbied the legislatures of
New York and Ontario to enact measures prohibiting spring shooting of wa-
terfowl.7
Years later, in 1911, the National Audubon Society, the American Game
Protective and Propagation Association pushed for the establishment of the
Canada-U.S. Treaty to conserve migratory birds. 8 This example is quite in-
teresting because it ties in with other discussions that we have had at the In-
stitute. The NGO leaders apparently explained to Canadian officials that
existing U.S. legislation protecting migratory birds was of questionable con-
stitutional status. In fact, lower federal courts struck down federal laws pro-
tecting migratory birds as not within the federal government's commerce
clause powers as a topic that falls within the reserved powers of the U.S.
States under the Tenth Amendment. 9 The NGOs alerted Canadian officials
that such legislation, if passed to implement a treaty, would likely survive
challenge. In fact, their predictions were right. The governments of the U.S.
and Canada did enter into a treaty for protection of migratory birds (it was
actually the U.K. government for reasons of which most of you are aware
since they were responsible for Canadian foreign relations at the time).1 ° The
U.S. Congress passed legislation to implement the treaty obligation. In a
challenge to the legislations, the Supreme Court held in Missouri v. Holland
7 Id. at 206-207.
8 Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Govern-
ance, 18 MICH. J. INT'LL. 183, 206-207 (1997).
9 United States v. Shauver, 214 Fed. 154, United States v. McCullagh, 221 Fed. 288;Geer
v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519, 16 Sup. Ct. 600, 40 L. Ed. 793.
10 Migratory Bird Treaty Act of July 3, 1918, c. 128, 40 Stat. 755.
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that the Tenth Amendment reserving powers to the U.S. States not granted to
the federal government was no limit on the treaty making power of the fed-
eral government and upheld the treaty and its implementing legislation."l
Therefore, the Missouri v. Holland case, which is basically in somewhat
simplified terms the reverse of your Labor Conventions Case in Canada,
really arose out of the urging of and creative thinking of a non-governmental
organization 2, an American non-governmental organization, that lobbied
Canadian government officials pursue the treaty.
In any description of early examples of NGO involvement in U.S.-Canada
relations, it is essential to mention the creation of the International Joint
Commission under the Boundary Waters Treaty in 1909.13 Depending on our
definition, one could even consider the International Joint Commission a
non-governmental organization, because, even though the members are ap-
pointed by government, they serve in their individual capacity. 14
The Institute has had many discussions on the International Joint Com-
mission in the past, including whether commission can serve as a model for
solving broader Canadian-U.S. disputes. The IJC involves the public and
NGOs in its work through public hearings. The IJC also establishes boards
on issues in which it draws members from state and local governments, and
even the private sector, to study scientific issues under their purview.
Thus, even if not an NGO itself, the UC has significant relations with
non-governmental organizations, the private sector, scientific organizations,
etc. This was true in its earliest days when the International Joint Commis-
sion was used to resolve differences over the Rainy Lake in the 1920s. 15 The
Commission held public hearings to hear witnesses from sub-national gov-
ernments, corporations, and NGOs. NGOs being heard included the Izaak
Walton League,' 6 the Western Ontario Chambers of Commerce, and the
American Legion.
17
Therefore, there is a long history of NGO involvement in U.S.-Canada re-
lations, and I should add because we are eventually going get to NAFTA,
which is actually a trilateral relationship, that NGO involvement in North
1" Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 40 S.Ct. 382, 64 L.Ed. 641, 11 A.L.R. 984, 18 Ohio
Law Rep. 61.
12 Attorney General of Canada v. Attorney General of Ontario (1937) 1 D.L.R. 673 (La-
bour Conventions case).
13 The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, Jan. 11, 1909, United States-Can., 36 Stat.
2448, T.S. No. 548.
14 See Layla A. Hughes, The Role of International Environmental Law in the Changing
Structure of International Law, 10 GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REV. 243, 244-245 (1998).
15 Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Govern-
ance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 183, 240 (1997).
16 id. at 248.
17 See http://www.legion.org (last visited Oct. 9, 2004).
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American affairs among the three countries of the United States, Canada, and
Mexico has origins going way back in time as well. For example, in 1936,
Franklin D. Roosevelt scheduled a North American Wildlife Conference that
was attended by U.S., Canada, and Mexico government officials, but also by
NGOs of the three countries. 8 I thought before we examined NAFTA that
we would cover the criticisms of and rationales for NGO involvement within
international organizations more generally.
CRITICISMS OF NGOS
There are three main criticisms you will hear with respect to NGOs being
allowed to participate directly in international institutions. The first criticism
is that NGOs are special interests, 19 and they may not be democratic institu-
tions themselves.2z In fact, most NGO leaders are not elected by their mem-
berships. Some would even argue that memberships rarely carefully scruti-
nize the policy positions taken by leaders of NGOs.
The second criticism that is frequently heard is that it is the role of na-
tional governments to balance competing interest, to hear from their NGOs,
to hear from their private sector and then form a common position and take
that government position to the international organization.2z This criticism
maintains that there is no need for direct input of NGOs and business into the
international forums. Rather, NGOs should give input to their own national
government.
The third major criticism you hear of NGO involvement directly in inter-
national institutions is the problem of a power imbalance between the North
and the South. 2 Specifically, it has thought that U.S. and other industrialized
country NGOs tend to have the financing and resources to actually become
involved. In contrast, it is thought that developing country NGOs with little
financing will not be able to obtain access in practice and will not be able to
have direct input.
18 Steve Chamovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Govern-
ance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 183, 247-248 (1997).
19 Monica Brookman, Book Review, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 369, 374 (2000) (reviewing
ANITA MARGRETHE HALVORSSEN, EQUALITY AMONG UNEQUALS IN INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1999)).
20 Paul Streeten, The Role of NGOs: Charity and Employment: Nongovernmental Organi-
zations and Development, 554 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL & SOC. SCL. 193, 196 (1997).
21 See generally Jude L. Fernando & Alan W. Heston, The Role of NGOs: Charity and
Empowerment: Introduction: NGOs Between States, Markets, and Civil Society, 554 ANNALS
AM. AcAD. POL & SOC. POL'Y & L. 8 (1997).
22 ANTHONY J. BEBBINGTON, The Role of NGOs: Charity and Empowerment: Rein-
venting NGOs and Rethinking Alternatives in the Andes, 554 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL & SOC.
POL'Y & L. 125 (1997).
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RATIONALES FOR NGOS
The rebuttals you hear to these criticisms are the rationales commonly put
forward for direct involvement of NGOs in international institutions. The
first rationale is that a lot of governments around the world are non-
democratic, so allowing NGO participation in international institutions may
be a partial cure to this democratic deficit and lack of transparency that oc-
curs in a lot of countries. Of course, in U.S.-Canada relations, that rationale
does not make much sense, despite election controversies that some Canadi-
ans might have heard we have experienced here in the U.S. (laughter in audi-
ence) Both the U.S. and Canada are open, transparent democratic systems, so
that rationale does not apply in the U.S.-Canada relations context. The sec-
ond rationale or rebuttal you hear to the criticisms of NGO involvement is
that there is an emerging transnational civil society. Therefore, there are
actually groups whose interests are not put forward by any single govern-
ment. Their interests are truly transnational, and they ought to be allowed
direct input into the international forum because their interests will not be
represented by any single national government.
What is somewhat ironic here is that we are going to see that NAFTA al-
lows for significant participation directly by NGOs, but does not make any
requirement that they be transnational. In fact, they allow single nation
NGOs to have input in international processes. However, what happens once
you allow that, you actually stimulate the creation of cooperative efforts
among NGOs in the different countries and the creation transnational net-
works between NGOs. It is a chicken and egg type problem. NAFTA proc-
esses do not require any transnationalism among NGOs accessing its proc-
esses, but it has actually fostered transnational ties among NGOs by opening
some processes to NGO involvement. We will see evidence of this phe-
nomenon in a moment when we look more closely at the NAFTA. There-
fore, we might ask if these two significant rebuttals to the criticisms of
NGOs' involvement really do apply in U.S.-Canada relations. If these two
major rationales put forth in a global context do not apply in the U.S.-Canada
context, then why have NGOs actually gained a participatory role in Canada-
U.S. relations?
I think there are at least three reasons. First, it is a testament to the politi-
cal power of NGOs in the U.S. and Canada. They were able to obtain the
access because they have significant power. The approval of NAFTA by the
U.S. Congress was in doubt. The NGOs said in effect that, "If you the gov-
ernments, the executive branches of government, do not give us access into
the environmental side agreement and the labor side agreement, then we are
going to try to defeat the approval of the agreement." In other words, NGOs,
particularly U.S. NGOs, have learned to play hardball. It will be interesting
to hear of the Canadian view in the question and answer period. By the way,
[Vol. 30:69
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I have no fear of using that term, hardball. I know the results of the Al
Franken v. Fox News dispute over the use of the term "fair and balanced.,
23
Therefore, I am not going to apologize to Chris Matthews over the use of the
term hardball. I am safe. (laughter in the audience).
The second reason NGOs have obtained a prominent role in U.S.-Canada
relations and this reason ties in somewhat with the first, is the need for politi-
cal approval and perceptions of legitimacy regarding the NAFTA. NAFTA
approval in the U.S. may have been in doubt had not side labor and environ-
mental agreements been created that allowed for access of NGOs, but, more
generally, perceptions of legitimacy out in the general public may have been
undermined as well.
Finally, you can make the argument that NGO involvement is a good
governance measure. A recent OECD study on engaging citizens and poli-
cymaking states that strengthening relations with citizens is a sound invest-
ment in better policymaking and a core element of good governance.24 It
allows governments to tap new resources of policy relevant ideas, informa-
tion, and resources when making decisions. Equally important, it contributes
to the building of public trust in government.
Of course, the OECD study was actually talking in terms of engaging
civil society in domestic policymaking, but some of those same arguments
may apply internationally. Possible benefits of NGO involvement include
additional technical expertise being added and rapid feedback to govern-
ments of policy choices. Additionally, NGOs may be able to add intergen-
erational authenticity in such areas as environmental issues. Finally, NGO
involvement can lead to increased accountability through increased monitor-
ing of the behavior of nations, because nations often do not want to complain
about another nations' behavior due to higher political or diplomatic reasons.
NAFTA
As noted earlier, NAFTA is an example of the age of empowerment of
NGOs in U.S.-Canada relations, but also pointed to as evidence of the age of
empowerment of NGOs globally. This highlights the importance of NAFTA.
I wanted to look primarily at the side environmental agreement, the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 25 the side labor agree-
23 Fox News Network, LLC v. Penguin Group (USA), Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18693;
31 Media L. Rep. 2254 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
24 OECD, FIGHTING CORRUPTION: WHAT ROLE FOR CIVIL SOCIETY? THE EXPERIENCE OF
THE OECD, available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/2/19567549.pdf (last visited Sept.
23, 2004).
25 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept.14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., arts. 22-36, 32 ILM 1480, 1482 (text) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994).
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ment, the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation,26 and on
NAFTA Chapter 11,27 the investment chapter of NAFTA. I am not going to
discuss Chapter 20, the general dispute settlement mechanism of NAFTA.
There have not been many Chapter 20 disputes. In fact, there has only been
only one Chapter 20 dispute between the U.S. and Canada, which I think
Sidney Picker knows a little bit about. Nor am I going to discuss Chapter 19
of NAFTA providing for bi-national panel review of national administrative
determinations in the field of anti-dumping and countervailing duties.
THE SIDE ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENT
The side environmental agreement has an obligation that countries effec-
tively enforce their domestic environmental laws.28 It also has a weak obli-
gation to strive for high levels of environmental protection, but this latter
obligation is not subject to the dispute submission process.29
The obligations that are subject to the submission process for NGOs and
the formal dispute settlement process is that a country effectively enforce its
domestic environmental laws. The submission process allows any NGO or
person to make a submission to the independent secretariat, which is based in
Montreal. 30 The secretariat does have to get their budget and work plan ap-
proved by the council,3' comprised of the environment ministers from the
United States, Canada and Mexico. 32 However, the secretariat operates inde-
pendently in most respect and is the body that receives NGO submissions on
enforcement matters. 33 In their submissions to the secretariat, NGOs must
make a claim that the accused party is failing to enforce effectively its envi-
ronmental law. The secretariat can then make a recommendation to the
council that the submission warrants development of what is called a factual
26 North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
arts. 27-41, 32 I.L.M. 1499, 1502 (text) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994).27 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 107 Stat. 2057,
reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
28 OECD, CITIZENS AS PARTNERS: INFORMATION, CONSULTATION AND PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION IN POLICY-MAKING, available at: http://wwwl.oecd.org/publications/e-
book/421131e.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2004).
29 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., prt. 2, art. 3, 32 ILM 1480, 1482 (text) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994).
30 See http://www.cec.org/who we-are/secretariat/index.cfm?varlan=english (last visited
Sept. 24, 2004).
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., part 3, Article 10 32 ILM 1480, 1482 (text) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994).
32 Gillian Dale, NAFTA: Commission for Environmental Cooperation, 1996 COLO. J. INT'L
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 26 (1997).
33 See Guideline art. 2.1, Guidelines Submissions, NACEC, Council Resolution 99-06,
available at: http://www.cec.org/citizen/guide submit/index.cfm?varlan=english (last visited
Sept. 25, 2004).
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record. This only requires two-thirds vote of the council. Therefore, two of
the three environmental ministers must vote in favor of it to go forward.
Once completed, the factual record is made public upon a two-thirds vote of
the council
34
There is no further remedy at the end of the NGO submission process.
NGOs can make submissions, the secretariat upon two-thirds approval can
develop a factual record, but, at the end of the day, all the submission process
can lead to is placing sunshine on the environmental enforcement problem.
It puts the problem in the public eye. There have been about 41 submissions
under the side environmental agreement made by NGOs since NAFTA came
into force in 1994. 35
Out of those 41 submissions, a lot, particularly the early ones, were dis-
missed by the secretariat even prior to the secretariat requesting the devel-
opment of a factual record. Why is that? Why were they dismissed? Well,
for a variety of reasons. First, a change in a country's law that lowers envi-
ronmental protection is not a failure to enforce law. It is a change in law. So
is there were several early submissions complaining about changes in laws,
rather than failure to enforce.
Second, one of the factors that the secretariat has to take into account be-
fore pursuing a factual record is whether judicial or administrative remedies
are being pursued. 36 It is not a strict exhaustion of local remedies require-
ment, but it is a factor they take into account. There have been submissions
dismissed on these grounds. Finally, there have also been cases dismissed
because parties are complaining about an alleged violation of an international
agreement, rather than failure to enforce effectively a country's domestic
environmental laws.
However, more and more submissions are going to the factual record
stage. There have been nine factual records that have been prepared.37
When the side agreements were negotiated, the prototypical case envisioned
were submissions by NGOs from Canada and the U.S. against Mexican en-
forcement practices. However, the law of unintended consequences pre-
vailed and there have been a variety of cases brought against each of the
three countries. Of the nine factual records prepared by the environmental
31 id. at art. 10.4.
35 Editor's note, as of September 26, 2004, there are now 47 submissions, see
http://www.cec.org/citizen/status/index.cfm?varlan=english (last visited Sept. 26, 2004).
6 See Guideline art. 5.6(c), Guidelines Submissions, NACEC, Council Resolution 99-06,
available at: http://www.cec.org/citizen/guide-submit/index.cfmvarlan=english (last visited
Sept. 25, 2004).
37 id.
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secretariat, four have involved Canadian practices,38 four involved Mexican
practices,39 and one involved U.S. practices.4°
In the one case against the U.S., there was an alleged lack of enforcement
by the federal government of the ban on the killing of migratory birds. The
interesting thing here is that although an NGO making a submission is not
required to be transnational, in this case, because it involves a transnational
issue, there were NGOs from the U.S., Mexico, and Canada, from all three
countries, that were the submitters in this case. The Canadian cases under
the side environmental agreement are a bit different.
All four Canadian cases were cases brought by Canadian NGOs, which is
why if you look at the proceedings of this Institute, there was question a year
or two ago that said basically this submission process being used by Cana-
dian NGOs to kick the teeth of the Canadian government.
However, whether or not one agrees with that claim, the newer cases indi-
cate a much more transnational bent, even with respect to submissions in-
volving Canadian enforcement practices. Of the eleven active files that are
now ongoing, what is prevalent is an increase in collaboration amongst
NGOs in U.S., Canada, and Mexico as submitters. You are not seeing the
single nation NGO submitter as frequently. Moreover, Mexican practices,
while frequently examined, are still not the only enforcement matters being
complained of in NGO submissions. In fact, of the active files, you have
seven concerning Mexico,41 four concerning CanadaA2 and none related to
U.S. practices.43
However, the interesting feature is the amount of submissions that are be-
ing made by NGOs from two or three countries. In one case, the Ontario
Power Generation case, that is alleging that emissions of mercury and other
dangerous toxins are polluting air and water downwind, both in Canada and
the United States, there are 49 NGOs that are the submitters in that case.
an
I think that is quite an interesting development. The submission process
was created without requiring transnationalism of the submitters but the sys-
tem itself is fostering transnational alliances between NGOs.
38 id.
39 Id.
40 id.
41 Editor's note, as of Sept. 26, 2004, there are now 8 claims against Mexico, Id.
42 Id.
43 Editor's note, as of Sept. 26, 2004, there is now a claim against the U.S., Id.
44 Editor's note, the Ontario Power Generation claim was not recommended for prepara-
tion of factual record, however, the names of the submitters are available at:
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/O I -SUB-CECf.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2004).
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THE LABOR SIDE AGREEMENT.
Like the side environmental agreement, the side labor agreement is fo-
cused on failure to enforce effectively domestic labor laws. The system is
somewhat different in the environmental side agreement. Each country es-
tablishes what is called an NAO, a National Administrative Office, within
their labor department. NGOs or labor unions can complain to the NAO in
their country about another nation's failure to enforce their labor laws.4 5
Therefore, in other words, you do not complain to the U.S. NAO about a
failure of the U.S. government to enforce its labor law. You complain to
either the Canadian NAO, or the Mexican NAO about U.S. enforcement
practices and vice-versa.
As with the environmental side agreement, it was envisioned that the side
labor agreements complaint process would primarily involve cases against
Mexico. This vision is a little bit truer under the side labor agreement than
46the side environmental agreement. There have been 26 cases, primarily
complaints dealing with Mexico. Of the complaints brought against the U.S.
practices, most have been lodged with the Mexican NAO.
However, there have been two submissions filed with Canada's NAO re-
garding U.S. practices47 and two submissions filed with the U.S. NAO about
Canadian practices. 48 Therefore, there is some Canada-U.S. dynamic even
under the side labor agreement. Again, four out of the 26 cases have been
U.S.-Canada cases.
Two of the four U.S.-Canada cases were not accepted for review 49 and of
the other two, one resulted in a new memorandum of understanding between
the INS and the Department of Labor dealing with migrant workers, 50 and the
other led to a meeting by the Quebec government with union representa-
tives 1
45 Hannah L. Meils, A Lesson From NAFTA: Can the FTAA Function as a Tool For Im-
provement in the Lives of Working Women?, 78 Ind. L.J. 877, 890-891 (2003).46 NAFTA Turns Ten 1994-2004, NACLA Report on the America (2004) at America 6.
47 Canadian NAO Submission 98-2, 99-1, available at:
http://www.naalc.org/english/summary-canada.shtml (last visited Sept. 25, 2004).
48 U.S. NAO Submission 9803, 9803, available at:
http://www.naalc.org/english/summary usa.shtml (last visited Sept. 25, 2004).
49 U.S. NAO Submission 9804, See http://www.naalc.org/english/summary-usa.shtml (last
visited Sept. 25, 2004), Canadian NAO Submission 99-1, available at:
http://www.naalc.org/english/summary canada.shtml (last visited Sept. 25, 2004).
50 Canadian NAO Submission 98-2, available at:
http://www.naalc.org/english/summary canada.shtml (last visited Sept. 25, 2004).
51 U.S. NAO Submission 9803, available at:
http://www.naalc.org/english/summary-usa.shtml (last visited Sept. 25, 2004).
11
S efer: Role of Non-Gover mental Orga izations i  C nada-U.S. Rel tions,
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2004
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
CHAPTER 11
Chapter 11 allows private investors to bring claims against host govern-
ments for violation of the substantive obligations in the NAFTA Investment
Chapter, primarily obligations requiring national treatment, most-favored-
nation treatment, the international minimum standard of treatment, and inter-
national standards regarding expropriation.
Depending on how we define NGO, a private investor or for-profit entity
can be considered an NGO under some definitions. Private investors have
52access to the Chapter 11 system, but one of the things that has come up in
these cases, because some of them have environmental implications or labor
implications, is there has been a push by NGOs, again using our commonly
understood definition of not-for profits entities only, to be able to file amicus
briefs in these cases.
There have been two cases where NGOs have asked for the ability to file
amicus briefs. The first case where the issue of filing amicus briefs was
raised was the Methanex case.53 It was a case that dealt with a complaint by
a Canadian investor regarding California's ban on MTBE, an additive in
gasoline. Some parties say MTBE only makes ground water smell very bad
when leaks into it. Other parties say well, if it smells funny, there is proba-
bly something else wrong with it that can harm us. 54 UPS was the other case
in which NGOs asked for the ability to submit amicus briefs.55 UPS brought
a Chapter 11 case arguing that the Canadian postal monopoly was assisting
the express mail services in Canada, and that Canadian customs is giving
some preferential treatment to express mail packs by Canada Post that it is
not giving to UPS.
56
In both those cases, the NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitral panels were working
under the UNCITRAL arbitration rules, and there is nothing explicitly in
those rules on the issue of amicus briefs. Both arbitration panels interpreted
broader provisions in those rules to basically allow submission of amicus
briefs.
52 Robert K. Paterson, A New Pandora's Box? Private Remedies for Foreign Investors
Under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 8 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DIsp. RESOL.
77, 84 (2000).
53 Press Release, International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, Methanex
v. United States of America, NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules Proceeding (Jan. 30,
2004) (on file with ICSID, Washington, D.C., U.S.A.).
54 Benjamin W. Putnam, The Cross-Border Trucking Dispute: Finding A Way Out of the
Conflict Between NAFTA and U.S. Environmental Law, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 1287, 1308 (2004).
55 UPS v. Canada, para 73 (ICSID (W. Bank) Oct. 17, 2001), available at:
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/IntVent-oct.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2004).
6 UPS v. Canada, paras. 9-10 (ICSID Nov. 22, 2002), available at: http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/Jurisdiction%20Award.22Nov02.pdf (last visited Sept. 23,
2004).
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In those cases, Mexico, because they have the ability to submit their
views in these cases, argued against allowing amicus briefs by NGOs,5 7 and
the private investors in these cases argued against it as well, at least in the
58Methanex case. However, the interesting development is that the U.S.,
Canada and Mexico have now issued a statement by the trade ministers from
all three countries saying nothing in NAFTA Chapter 11 prohibits the sub-
mission of amicus briefs in Chapter 1 1 cases. Additionally, the trade minis-
ters' statement lays out the criteria that future Chapter 11 panels should con-
sider when deciding whether to accept an amicus brief from a particular en-
tity.5
9
The basic factors that are to be considered are whether the NGO has a
particular knowledge or insight that is different from that of the disputing
parties. Essentially, arbitrators are to ask whether the NGO is bringing
something new to the table and that the NGO amici are going to address mat-
ters within the scope of dispute, so they are not expanding the scope of the
dispute. Additional factors that the arbitrators are to consider are that the
NGOs have a significant interest in the arbitration, and that there is a public
interest in the arbitration.
Now, a further development that some NGOs are seeking is that we have
open hearings for Charter 11 arbitral hearings. In the UPS case, I believe
they did have an open hearing.60 Mexico is still opposed to opening up to the
public Chapter 11 proceedings,61 but Canada and the United States made a
statement late last year when they made this joint statement with Mexico on
amicus briefs.62 Canada and the United States basically said, "We will con-
sent to open up Chapter 11 proceedings involving us, and we will request the
private investor that we are facing to also agree to open up the proceedings."
So is this age of empowerment that is reflected in NAFTA a good devel-
opment? One could say, "Look, there was no choice, so why ask whether it
51 UPS v. Canada, (ICSID June 11, 2001), available at: http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-
nac/documents/FirstMexican1128SubmissionAmicusJunel101.pdf (last visited Sept. 23,
2004).
58 David MacArthur, NAFTA Chapter 11: On an Environmental Collision Course with the
World, 2003 Utah L. Rev. 913, 929 (2003).
59 Andrew J. Shapren, NAFTA Chapter 11: A Step Forward in International Trade Law or
a Step Backward for Democracy? 17 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 323, 348-349 (2003).
60 See Press Release, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, United
Parcel Service of American, Inc. v. Government of Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules Proceeding (Jul. 25, 2002) (stating that the parties in the UPS v. Canada NAFTA Chap-
ter 1 Idispute have agreed to make the hearing on the objections to jurisdiction open to the
public), available at: http:// www.worldbank.org/icsid/ups.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2004).
61 Press Release, NAFTA Joint Commission Statement (Oct. 7, 2003) (on file with Cana-
dian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade) available at: http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/nafta-alena/Nondisputing-en.pdf (last modified June 27, 2004).
62 Id.
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was good or bad? It was politically necessary. You do not get NAFTA
unless you have the side labor agreement providing for this inclusion of
NGOs at the international level." But beyond this realpolitik answer, I think
there is some reasons we can say it is beneficial. One, it does provide a
backup. If there has been any failure in the domestic policy process, or en-
forcement process, this provides a second net that can catch defects in the
policy formation process.
U.S. and Canadian systems are open, transparent and democratic, but not
perfect. Therefore, it may provide a backup to remaining imperfections in
our domestic processes.
You also have to ask yourself if you are an opponent to NGOs being in-
volved in international institutions like NAFTA, that if you exclude them,
what other forms of involvement are they going to pursue? Where else might
they try to press the levers? So skeptics of NGO involvement might still
think it is better to include them in, rather than having them press other levers
or as Premier Rae warned having NGOs trying to co-op public opinion
against the trade agreements.
Finally, there are truly transnational issues brought out in many of these
submissions, the case regarding migratory birds being a prime example.
There are numerous issues coming up in this these cases that are truly trans-
national and ought to have transnational networks of civil society able to
access the international system.
Let me finish up in two minutes because I think I am running short of
time. I have largely left out businesses and labor unions from the equation so
far under the definition of NGOs we have been operating under.
Obviously, businesses, for-profit entities have a huge impact and huge
rule in U.S.-Canada relations, both through the market itself, the private deci-
sion of businesses, but also in terms of their lobbying efforts.
You all are familiar with the statistics. There is 1.3 billion dollars in trade
each day between the two countries. 63 Canadian investment in the U.S. sup-
ports 640,000 jobs.64 U.S. investment in Canada supports 1 million jobs.65
40 percent of U.S.-Canada trade is intra-firm trade.66 Approximately 35,000
trucks cross daily.67 There are 200 million people crossings each year.68
63 Ottawa gives 229 million US Dollars to Improve Western Border Crossings, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, March 5, 2003.
64 Earl Fry, Canada-U.S. Economic Opportunities: A Window of Opportunity, Policy Op-
tions (Feb. 2003) at 33, available at: http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/feb03/fry.pdf (last visited
Sept. 24, 2004).
Id.
66 Monthly Trade Bulletin (Oct. 2001) available at:
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/ineas-
aes.nsf/vwapj/mtb200l12e.pdf/$FILE/mtb20012e.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2004).
67 John D. Schulz, Record Roadcheck; Three-day Commercial Truck Safety Blitz Places
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Look at the automotive industry, GM, Ford, and Chrysler are the top U.S.
investors in Canada. The decisions of those private actors have a great im-
pact on U.S.-Canada relations. In respect to unions, there is actually an alli-
ance between telecommunication unions in the United States and Canada and
even Mexico now.
In terms of lobbying, I have several examples here. I will not go through
them all. There is Canadian-American Border Trade Alliance, which you
will hear in about a half hour, an association involving all kinds of private
entities and government entities working on border crossing issues.
There is the Canadian America Business Counsel. There is a New York
State Smart Border Coalition. Americans for Better Borders is an Associa-
tion and it is miss-titled, because it includes several Canadian organizations.
In short, a broader definition of NGOs to include for-profit entities will re-
veal a whole host of additional involvement in U.S.-Canada relations.
PRINCIPLES THAT SHOULD GUIDE PARTICIPATION OF NGOS IN
U.S.-CANADA RELATIONS
First, there ought to be a rule of equality between stakeholders. We
should not be excluding for-profits and allowing in non-profits or trying to
distinguish between certain stakeholders. There should be a rule of equality,
and we actually observe one in the NAFITA system.
I mentioned under the side environmental agreement that it is mostly en-
vironmental NGOs that are the submitters. However, for-profit businesses
have actually submitted petitions under the side environmental agreement in
the Methanex case 69 I mentioned earlier. The Methanex case represents a
two-pronged attack by the foreign investor. California, the investor alleges,
was failing to enforce their underground tank storage laws, that failure to
enforce led to the leakage of MTBE into the ground water, and subsequently
led the state to ban MTBE. Therefore, the private investor claimed, "You
expropriated our investment, you violated the international minimum stan-
dard of treatment" under Chapter 11. However, they also brought a claim
under the side environmental agreement that said, "You are failing to effec-
tively enforce your underground storage tank laws."
Thus, there is a rule of equality under the side environmental agreement.
It also should be there for NAFTA Chapter 11 and it is now that all three
governments have agreed to allow amicus brief submissions. That is real
Nearly One in Four Trucks Out of Service, TRAFFIC WORLD, (July 7, 2003) at 26.
68 Facts on the Secure Flow of People, Canada-U.S. Immigration Cooperation, available
at: http://www.canadianembassy.org/border/immigration-en.asp (last visited Sept. 23, 2004).
69 Methanex v. United States of America, supra note 57.
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change. It is also one of the ironies of NAFTA inclusion of NGOs. Tradi-
tional rationales do not apply in the U.S.-Canadian context. Were it not for
Mexico being added into the free trade regime and concerns over Mexican
environmental enforcement, labor enforcement and democratic deficit, we
probably would not have so much NGO involvement in U.S.-Canada rela-
tions. The institutionalized involvement of NGOs in U.S.-Canada relations
did not occur as a result of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement that en-
tered into force five years prior to NAFTA. It is all as a result of NAFTA.
Bringing in Mexico has actually had a positive effect on NGO involvement
in U.S.-Canada relations.
A second key principle that should guide the U.S. and Canada is access of
the public to information and the processes. One of the problems is that in-
volving stakeholders is great, yet all these groups are competing to influence
public opinion. If you have a closed process, you can have groups influenc-
ing public opinion through misleading characterizations of the process.
While it might be a bit much to put NAFTA cases on Court T.V.(and it is
likely that people would not watch it, in fact, Court T.V. will not broadcast it
because it will not get high enough ratings), more openness in the proceed-
ings would be a positive development. The United States and Canada have
agreed to open proceedings in Chapter 11 cases already. Some people say,
"How can you allow all these people in the room in which the proceedings
are being held; what if 150 people show up and the room allows only 20?"
The Canadian statement already foresees these problems. You can handle
these problems in a variety of ways, either through webcasting on the Inter-
net, or through closed circuit television in a separate room. Either of these
solutions will prevent any disturbances protests in the room holding the pro-
ceedings. In short, there are a lot of ways with modern technology to achieve
more openness for the general public. In sum, in this age of empowerment
for NGOs, the two governments must ensure that they stick to the rule of
equality among stakeholders and make sure that the general public is not shut
out of the process.
Thank you.
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